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I. Introduction
The financial crisis that had been developing in the United 
States for several years became evident to all in 2007 
and worsened significantly in 2008. In the aftermath of 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the crisis spread rapidly 
to other countries, especially in Europe, where banks 
and other institutions were exposed to the same toxic 
assets that lay at the core of the problems in the US and 
where real estate prices had registered the biggest gains 
over the previous decade. The impact of the crisis on the 
entire global economy was swift and severe – spreading 
through the contraction of global liquidity and capital 
flows, an almost unprecedented collapse in trade, and a 
major softening of commodity prices. The prospects for 
global growth were repeatedly revised downward as the 
dimensions of the crisis became increasingly evident. At 
their low point, projections by the IMF saw global GDP 
declining by 1.3 percent in 2009, then rebounding to an 
expansion of 1.9 percent for 2010.1 
More specifically, the advanced economies were 
expected to contract 3.8 percent in 2009 before 
recovering in 2010. Growth in the emerging market and 
developing countries (referred to as the EMCs in this 
paper) was expected to slow to 1.6 percent in 2009 
and then rebound to 4.0 percent in 2010. Some of the 
fastest growing emerging market economies, such as 
PRC and India, were projected to see their growth rates 
cut by about one third – in 2009 as compared to their 
experience in the immediately preceding years. The world 
economy looked to be on a precipice, and indeed it was! 
The outcome to date has seen economic conditions in 
many countries, especially in the more advanced econo-
mies, deteriorate more than had been observed at any 
time since the depression of the 1930s, and the recovery 
in the advanced economies remains halting and uneven.
While by any measure the crisis has had a devastat-
ing impact on the global economy, things have not turned 
1  IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2009.
out quite as bad as most observers had forecast in 
2009. Activity in the global economy and in the advanced 
economies declined slightly less than originally forecast. 
But the big surprise came in the EMCs.
Growth in most of EMCs held up better than 
expected and in many cases, it performed much better. 
This group of countries grew by 2.4 percent in 2009, and 
is expected to expand by 6.3 percent in 2010,2 near their 
immediate pre-crisis growth rates. Still, the impact of the 
global crisis on the EMCs was severe, with trade declin-
ing dramatically, capital flows interrupted, remittances 
and tourism falling, currencies depreciating markedly, 
equity and commodity prices dropping sharply, and fear 
gripping all sectors of these economies. The prospects 
for these countries were expected to be closely tied to 
activity in the more advanced economies, as had been 
the historical experience. However, this turned out not 
to be the case. The largest EMCs – led by PRC, India, 
Indonesia, and Brazil – surprised most international 
observers as they became the first to rebound and con-
tinue to experience robust growth.
As the emerging market countries have grown and 
matured, there has been much debate about whether 
their own performance had in some ways become less 
dependent on conditions in the industrial countries, 
i.e., whether they had “decoupled”. In an earlier paper 
discussed at the 2008 Emerging Markets Forum, it was 
argued that, if anything, the inter-linkages between the 
industrial and emerging world have become far more 
complex and multi-dimensional in recent years and that 
“the very concept of decoupling seems almost quaint”.3 
Despite this increased interdependence, it has been 
argued in that paper and elsewhere that, while remaining 
2  IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, April 2010.
3  See: Emerging Market Economies and the Global Financial Crisis: Resilient 
or Vulnerable in Turbulent Times, by Jack Boorman, Anupam Basu, Manu Bhaskaran and 
Claudio Loser, Emerging Markets Forum, October 2008.
IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2007, “Chapter 4. Decoupling the Train? Spillovers and 
Cycles in the Global Economy”.
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“coupled”, the capacity of EMCs to offset the impact 
of events originating in the industrial world might have 
increased, most importantly through the power of their 
own policy reactions . The recent crisis appears to have 
demonstrated that resilience with surprising clarity. 
The policy space enjoyed by many emerging market 
countries, and their confidence to employ that space, 
derived in large part from the reforms introduced in the 
wake of the crises that engulfed so many of the emerg-
ing market economies between about 1994 and 2003. 
In particular, these crises demonstrated all too clearly 
the fragility of international capital flows, the massive 
pressures that could be put on exchange rates from 
interruptions in such flows, and the dramatic impact that 
these reversals could have on the domestic economy. 
One response on the part of many countries was to 
accumulate large stocks of international reserves to help 
insure themselves against such volatility in the future. 
Perhaps even more importantly, these crises made all too 
evident the weaknesses in the economic and financial 
structures and institutions in many of these countries 
and the self-aggravating dynamics set in motion by such 
institutional weakness. As a result, many emerging econ-
omies introduced significant reforms in macroeconomic 
policy-making frameworks, in regulatory and supervisory 
regimes, in accounting standards, legal frameworks, 
and data-reporting standards, and in transparency more 
generally. In the aftermath of the 1994-2003 crises, these 
crisis-prevention reforms were pursued with a vigour not 
seen before.4 
As a result of these reforms, many emerging market 
countries had a much enhanced capacity to respond 
to the contagion spreading across the global economy 
– a capacity that had not existed before. What policy 
actions were taken by the emerging market countries 
to help counter the impact of the latest financial crisis 
and subsequent recession in the advanced economies? 
What specific reforms contributed to the capacity of 
those countries to successfully design and implement 
4  See “Crisis Prevention: Lessons From Emerging Markets For Advanced 
Economies” by Jonathan T. Fried and James A Haley In M. Giovanoli and D. Devos, Interna-
tional Monetary and Financial Law, Oxford 2010.
such policies? What can be inferred from the changes 
made to the economic and financial institutions in those 
countries and from the other policy reforms introduced 
over the past decade or longer about the resilience of 
these countries to problems that develop elsewhere in 
the global system? 
It is important to note that the rebound, as measured by 
actual economic growth since the second half of 2009 
and projected GDP growth for the remainder of 2010, 
varies substantially across EMCs. Some have grown very 
fast and are expected to grow at around 10 percent in 
2010-2011, while others are expected to register barely 
any growth. What helps explain the different speeds 
of recovery across EMCs? This paper examines these 
questions. It begins with a review of the initial impact of 
the crisis on some 59 selected emerging market coun-
tries5 and its transmission channels, and then addresses 
each of these questions in turn.
The results of this analysis point to the critical role 
played by the substantive reforms made by many of the 
emerging market countries in the wake of earlier crises. 
The Centennial Resilience Index developed in this paper 
suggests that those countries that had strengthened 
the underlying institutions and structural aspects of their 
economies, and created policy space through cautious 
monetary and fiscal policies, were in a position to counter 
the impact of the shock that originated in the global 
financial system. They had successfully created both the 
room for policy adjustment and the capacity to design 
and implement policies that – after the initial shock – 
sharply limited the negative impact of the crisis on their 
economies.     
5  In selecting a sample of representative EMCs, two important considerations 
were taken into account: that the group reflects all geographical regions and that data 
limitations affecting individual countries do not constrain the construction of the Resilience 
index. Manageability of a very large data set was also a consideration. The sample com-
prises Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, PRC, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Ka-
zakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, 




































































































II. The Impact of the Crisis on Emerging Market 
and Developing Countries6   
The emerging global crisis in 2007 and early 2008 was 
initially expected by most analysts and economists to 
result in a shallow recession in the US. However, the 
turmoil in the major financial centers, and the slowdown 
in activity in the advanced economies that followed the 
seizing up of the market for securitized credit and, most 
dramatically, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, rapidly 
spread around the world.  Global growth contracted 
sharply from over 5 percent in 2007 to -0.6 percent in 
2009, marking the worst global decline since the Great 
Depression.
However, this collapse hides significant differences 
between countries and regions. Growth in the advanced 
economies declined from  2.7 percent in 2007 to -3.2 
percent in 2009. The emerging market countries in the 
6  From this section onward, the paper refers to the group of 59 selected 
countries listed in footnote 5, unless indicated otherwise.
sample employed in this paper experienced a decline in 
real GDP growth from 5.6 percent in 2008 to 2.0 percent 
in 2009.  The emerging economies in Eastern Europe 
were affected most severely, with GDP contracting by 3.7 
percent; those in Latin America experienced a decline 
of 1.8 percent; but EMCs in Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East avoided a recession, with developing Asia growing 
as fast as 6.6 percent in 2009. Moreover, Figure 2 shows 
the considerable variation across a number of EMCs of 
the decline in GDP growth during the period in which the 
shock was felt the most severely, from the third quarter of 
2008 to the second quarter of 2009.
The transmission of the crisis from the advanced 
economies to the EMCs came through a number of 
channels: 
The Financial Channel. Financial institutions in 
most EMCs were not significantly exposed to the toxic 
assets that affected banks in many of the advanced 
economies, and the use of derivatives was much more 



































































































































World Emerging and developing economies Sample Countries6
“
away from engaging in the more exotic transactions or 
were prevented from doing so by regulations affecting 
such transactions, which, in many cases, had not been 
liberalized in previous years. However, the EMCs were 
not immune to sudden stops or reversals of capital flows. 
Some global banks withdrew funds from their subsidiar-
ies in EMCs to rebuild their liquidity or capital base in 
the home countries; credit flows through international 
banks and global bond markets to EMCs all but dried 
up (severely affecting emerging Europe); the major 
uncertainties about the likely impact of the crisis led to 
collapses in export credit to EMCs and portfolio invest-
ments; and even foreign direct investment (with some lag, 
as one would expect) contracted sharply. The seizing up 
of international credit markets was followed by a similar 
process in domestic financial systems: interbank markets 
froze and domestic credit expansion came to a virtual 
standstill in many EMCs. The financial freeze, in turn, con-
tributed to a collapse in domestic demand and economic 
activity. Moreover, the sudden stop (or reversal in some 
cases) of capital inflows, including export financing, led to 
significant currency depreciations and some international 
reserve losses (for the latter, see Figure 5). Table 1 and 
Figure 2 show these financial developments.
The Real Activity Channel. As demand in the 
advanced economies collapsed, so did exports from 
EMCs, although with considerable variation in terms of 
timing and intensity. The speed and severity of the export 
collapse was almost unprecedented! First, there was a 
major drop in exports from those EMCs that had become 
the largest exporters of manufactured goods to the 
advanced economies and from those EMCs that supplied 
those countries exporting to the advanced economies. 
Soon thereafter, exporters of commodities and intermedi-
ate goods experienced a similar shock; In this context, 
the IMF’s index of commodity prices dropped by 56% 
percent from the peak experienced in mid-2008 to the 
trough in early 2009.
The fall in export earnings and the accompanying 
slowdown in economic activity led to concerns about the 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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quality of the banks’ loan portfolios, further intensifying 
the freeze in the domestic credit markets. The decline 
in export activity was compounded by a contraction in 
domestic demand, reflecting consumer fears, the large 
loss of wealth caused by the drop in stock market prices, 
and the postponement of investment plans. In turn, the 
decline in activity led to a significant drop in government 
revenue, weakening public finances. This posed a serious 
challenge to policy makers, given the tightness of financing 
availability in some EMCs, including financing from the glo-
bal markets. Commodity exporters were further affected 
by the sharp decline in commodity prices that followed the 
collapse of global demand.
Similarly, remittances and tourism were considerably 
affected, although with a lag in the case of the former. The 
magnitude of the decline in remittance receipts appears 
to have been closely linked to the fall in activity in the coun-
tries of origin. For instance, remittances from the US to 
2006 2007 2008 2009
Asia
Portfolio Inflows (% change) 32.7% 46.5% -39.0% 2.1%
FDI (% change) 31.6% 36.0% -5.8% -7.5%
Flow of Export Credits (USD bil) 12.6 16.6 29.0 -29.5
Domestic Credit (% change) 13.3% 31.7% 15.6%
Latin America
Portfolio Inflows 19.6% 39.5% -29.8% -48.5%
FDI 13.6% 21.8% 2.9% -27.6%
Flow of Export Credit 5.4 8.4 9.6 -14.0
Domestic Credit 13.3% 13.9% 19.4%
Eastern Europe
Portfolio Inflows 39.4% 33.1% -47.3% 21.8%
FDI 48.9% 60.2% -22.8% 13.5%
Flow of Export Credit 8.0 12.0 13.2 -19.8
Domestic Credit 30.5% 36.7% 28.2%
Sub-Saharan Africa
Portfolio Inflows 25.2% 29.8% -31.5% 3.5%
FDI 13.0% 23.7% -22.0% 11.7%
Flow of Export Credit 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6
Domestic Credit 34.1% 65.5% 49.7%
Middle East/North Africa
Portfolio Inflows 4.9% 23.2% -12.5% 30.8%
FDI 34.0% 22.5% 8.2% 9.5%
Flow of Export Credit 4.7 0.3 0.6 -9.7
Domestic Credit 7.9% 59.2% 48.8%
*Limited data available FDI and portfolio investment data available for PRC and the African countries.










































































































































































































Q2 2006 Q3 2006 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008
Central and Eastern 
Europe 11.4% 2.9% 9.6% -0.2% 9.9% 3.4% 12.9% 6.2%
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.2% 6.9% -6.3% 2.6% 9.2% 5.0% 16.9% 3.6%
Developing Asia 11.7% 11.8% 2.1% -4.4% 11.8% 10.3% 3.5% -4.6%
Middle East and 
North Africa 8.3% 5.1% -7.7% 0.4% 10.5% 6.5% 12.2% 16.1%
Western Hemisphere 9.7% 5.7% -3.7% -1.3% 11.2% 4.7% 5.8% -1.8%
Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010
Central and Eastern 
Europe 10.4% -2.7% -24.4% -15.6% 5.3% 10.9% 10.4% -8.4%
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.3% 7.8% -31.2% -34.5% 14.7% 23.4% 10.8% -1.6%
Developing Asia 15.0% 9.4% -16.6% -24.3% 9.3% 15.3% 8.6% -4.2%
Middle East and 
North Africa 12.5% 9.9% -30.9% -35.7% 10.6% 16.8% 7.9% 3.8%
Western Hemisphere 15.5% 4.2% -20.7% -24.8% 10.4% 11.7% 5.0% -1.0%
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
*Limited data available FDI and portfolio investment data available for PRC and the African countries.
Exports Growth Rates, by region (Quarter-over-quarter)  
Table 
2
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Worker’s Remittances 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
(estimated)
East Asia and Pacific 40,336 50,460 57,598 71,309 86,115 84,785
Europe and Central Asia 20,955 30,089 97,341 50,777 57,801 49,279
Latin America and Caribbean 43,330 50,122 59,199 63,239 64,717 58,481
Middle-East and North Africa 23,034 24,958 26,112 31,364 34,696 32,212
South Asia 28,694 33,924 42,523 54,041 73,293 71,955
Sub-Saharan Africa 8,021 9,379 12,629 18,646 21,139 20,525
Source: Migration and Development Brief 12, World Bank. April 23, 2010.
Note: This table presents data for all Emerging Market and Developing Countries, as specific data for the sample countries were not readily available for 
the entire time period.
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Mexico have experienced an exceptional drop. A similar 
development seems to have affected tourism, with tourist 
arrivals in Asia and the Pacific, as well as in the Americas, 
falling considerably in early 2009, but subsequently 
recovering. 
The freeze of international capital flows and the 
collapse in exports, as well as in tourist arrivals and 
remittances, in some cases led to considerable currency 
depreciations and significant losses in international 
reserves in those countries that used their foreign 
exchange holdings to buffer the external shock. The 
currency depreciations and reserve losses have been 
subsequently reversed in a number of countries, in some 
cases by a considerable resumption of portfolio capital 
inflows. 
Inflation in many EMCs had risen considerably in 
2007 and early 2008 in line with increases in commodity 
prices, particularly food and fuel, and booming credit and 
monetary expansion. However, that pattern was reversed 
in late 2008 as the price pressures receded with the 
collapse in global demand. While currency depreciations 
precluded a faster decline in local prices in a number 
of countries, lower exogenous inflationary pressures 
facilitated the adoption of expansionary macroeconomic 
policies to stimulate domestic demand and help limit the 
downturn in activity.
III. The Policy response
The magnitude of the external shock to export-depend-
ent EMCs clearly underscored the need for action to 
stimulate domestic demand. In addition, the strong G-20 
call for a coordinated policy response likely increased 
pressure on policymakers of the larger EMCs to take 
action, while simultaneously providing additional confi-
dence to embark on stimulus packages. Policy actions 
included measures in the fiscal, monetary, and financial 
sectors. The ability of policy makers to react quickly 
(and in a somewhat coordinated fashion) in the design 
Stock Market Indices 
(% change)
Exchange Rate Changes 
(% change in terms of USD)
2008 2009 2010 Peak to 
Trough 2008 2009 2010
Hong Kong, China -46.9% 42.9% 2.7% -58.3% 6.0% 0.1% 0.4%
India -58.1% 90.2% 16.69% -62.4% -23.8% 6.0% 0.0%
Indonesia -50.6% 87.0% 38.15% -53.2% 18.5% -15.3% -3.5%
Philippines -48.3% 63.0% 34.31% -51.4% 15.2% -1.9% -5.9%
PRC -65.4% 80.0% -18.96% -71.0% 6.0% 0.2% 0.4%
Republic of Korea -40.7% 49.7% 11.29% -48.5% -34.6% 8.7% -2.5%
Thailand -47.6% 63.3% 32.78% -55.7% 16.7% -0.4% -13.1%
Brazil -41.2% 82.7% 1.23% -49.6% -29.8% 25.2% -0.4%
Israel -46.4% 78.8% 5.52% -48.3% -1.7% 0.2% -3.5%
Mexico -25.7% 45.3% 4.87% -43.8% -25.3% 5.9% -0.2%
Turkey -51.6% 96.6% 24.51% -58.3% 30.4% -1.5% -3.7%
United States -40.9% 24.8% 1.34% -55.2%
Source: World Federation of Exchanges. OANDA.
*2010 numbers are through September







































































































The factor analysis in this paper, as well as work by others, suggests that many emerging market countries were able to moderate the 
impact on their economies of the global recession triggered by the financial crisis in the U.S. The capacity to design and implement 
policies that helped offset the impact of the current crisis was created by the reforms adopted by these countries in response to earlier 
crises to strengthen the macroeconomic fundamentals of their economies, to bolster their financial systems and, more generally, to 
improve their policy making institutions. This was the silver lining to the crises that had ravaged many of their economies during the 
1980s and 1990s.  
One of the key factors that explains both the resilience that had been created by the changed policy and performance of these 
economies over the previous decade or so, and the confidence to take the measures needed to help counter the external shock from the 
global crisis, was the accumulation of large – historically unprecedented – stocks of international reserves (figure 5).
 
This is the upside of that development. However, the conclusion to be drawn should not be to welcome that development as an 
unmitigated blessing and to encourage a continuation of such hoarding of reserves. The reserve accumulation by many of these 
countries was by almost any measure excessive. While there may be a tendency to welcome the self-insurance provided by large reserve 
holdings, and the policy space that they create, the high cost of accumulating and holding these reserves should not be ignored. Beyond 
some limit, this is a costly and inefficient way to provide insurance – both for the countries themselves and for the global system. 
For individual countries, the return on reserve holdings beyond a certain limit is likely to be lower than the returns to be made elsewhere 
– both in the real economy and in alternative financial assets. Similarly, the risks involved in the lack of diversification generally seen in 
such holdings can be large.
The preference of countries to self-insure themselves through excessive reserve holdings is also problematic for the global economic 
and monetary system. The recent crisis has taught us a great deal about the impact of perverse incentives in the financial markets.1 The 
result of so many actors in the financial system operating under perverse incentives is now all too clear.
But the international monetary system as currently constructed contains its own questionable and ineffective incentives. On the one 
hand, countries with fixed or heavily managed exchange rates that elect to drive growth in their economies through export promotion 
have an incentive to keep their currencies undervalued through one-way intervention in the exchange markets. The rationale of providing 
self-insurance helps provide cover for such countries.  On the other hand, for the countries providing the global system with the major 
reserve assets, policy discipline can be weakened. It can be argued that the choice of the U.S. dollar as the primary reserve asset 
by most countries is made because of the long track record of U.S. policies that – at least until recently - have created reasonable 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Combined with the unparalleled depth and breadth of U.S. financial markets and its open capital 
account, this choice seemed reasonable. However, it can also be argued that the incentive to excessive accumulation of reserves by 
emerging market countries in recent years has weakened policy discipline in the U.S, permitting unsustainable deficits in both the public 
and private sectors. These somewhat perverse incentives in the current global system – operating on both the reserve accumulating 
countries and the primary reserve supplying country - can thus be seen, at least in part, as causal factors in the recent crisis.
An additional causal factor, of course, has been the absence of rules in the international monetary system to prevent the development 
of large and prolonged imbalances in countries’ external accounts. In the absence of rules, which all but disappeared with the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, surveillance of countries’ exchange rate and other economic and financial policies was 
supposed to supplant the earlier rules-based system. Unfortunately, surveillance by the IMF has not been up to the task assigned to 
it – at least not for the largest advanced economies nor for some of the emerging market countries. This failure is not unique to the IMF. 
None of the other organizations or groupings involved in surveillance – the G7, the OECD, and others - have had much success.
This reality calls for a serious effort to reconsider the structure and the rules in the current international monetary system – or non-
system, as it is referred to by many.
1  Those perverse incentives operated at all levels of the mortgage markets in the U.S. and in some other countries. Mortgage originators who profited from immedi-
ate fee income had little interest in the credit quality of the loans they made; those institutions that bundled the mortgages with the primary objective of selling off to investors the 
securities so-created had a similar disinterest in quality; the rating agencies were for the most part ignorant of the risks embodied in the instruments they were rating and were 
driven, like the originators and the banks that created the securities, primarily by fee income; and investors were lulled into complacency by the confidence placed in the ratings 







































































































and implementation of such packages is testament 
to the increasing strength of the fundamentals of their 
economies. The size and extent of these packages varied 
significantly across the EMCs, depending on the avail-
able scope for policymakers to maneuver in these areas. 
This room for maneuver was, in part, dependent upon 
the reforms pursued in previous years. For example, 
the stronger and deeper the improvement in institutions 
and in macroeconomic fundamentals, the more ambi-
tious the package could be. Indeed, from statements 
of policymakers launching these packages, it is clear 
that in determining the size of the fiscal stimulus, policy 
makers balanced what they perceived was needed to 
achieve their objectives against the constraints imposed 
by those fundamentals, such as the stock of public debt 
in relation to GDP. Individual policymakers also took into 
account the relaxation of the fiscal stance resulting from 
automatic stabilizers. As a result, the overall deficits of 
the EMCs rose by an average of 4 percentage points of 
GDP, of which nearly 3 percentage points represented 
increased spending and 1 percentage point reflected 
lower revenue. 
It is important to note that a number of EMCs have 
withdrawn part of the stimulus packages as the econo-
mies recovered faster-than-expected.
In determining the nature and extent of the monetary 
stimulus, the same issues taken into account when 
considering the fiscal stimulus, as well as the expectation 
that the drop in global demand would result in receding 
inflationary pressures, seem to have prevailed.  Specific 


















South Africa 9.9 4.03%
Thailand 44.92 17.22%
Viet Nam 8.42 9.68%
Source: UNDP, Y. Zhang, N. Thelen, and A. Rao, Social protection in Fiscal Stimulus Packages: some Evidence, 2010.







































































































actions varied widely across countries and included the 
following:
•	 Cuts in policy rates and steps to raise credit. To 
stimulate domestic demand, in addition to cuts in 
policy interest rates, many central banks reduced 
reserve requirements (India), and engaged in 
direct lending through repos (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, India), direct purchases of bank debt, 
and newly created windows to help increase 
bank credit. 
•	 Unfreezing of Interbank Markets. These 
measures were supplemented by measures to 
unfreeze interbank markets, including central 
banks’ provisions of liquidity to larger banks to 
buy loan portfolios of smaller or weaker banks, 
guarantees of interbank loans (Brazil, Hungary, 
India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Russia), and the recapitalization of banks 
(Hungary, Republic of Korea).
•	 Extension of Deposit Insurance. Many central 
banks and regulatory agencies raised or 
extended prevailing deposit insurance ceil-
ings to guard against potential deposit runs 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Poland, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
Thailand), and guaranteed certain types of bank 
loans (Hungary). 
•	 Provision of External Financing. To address the 
sudden stop in external financing, many central 
banks established special credit lines in foreign 
exchange, including export financing (Brazil, 
Republic of Korea); entered into swap opera-
tions or reciprocal currency arrangements with 
other central banks (Brazil, Hungary, Republic 
of Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Singapore); restricted 
(currency) derivative operations (Indonesia); 
lowered ceilings on foreign exchange pur-
chases; eased open foreign exchange positions 
(Philippines); and guaranteed local banks’ exter-
nal debt (Republic of Korea). 
•	 Forbearance of Credit Risk and Additional 
Liquidity. In some cases, regulators introduced 
some forbearance, for example on credit risk 
assessment (especially for loans to clients 
severely affected by the crisis) and provisioning 
requirements. 
IV. The Centennial Resilience Index
While the crisis affected individual EMCs in varying 
degrees, the ability of many of those countries to absorb 
and recover from the shock has been impressive, even if 
some still face a difficult road ahead. Clearly, the capacity 
of many of these countries to offset the impact of events 
originating in the industrial world has increased. In an 
attempt to understand this phenomenon, we have built a 
Resilience Index. In contrast to the traditional vulnerability 
indicators, which can help explain a country’s susceptibil-
ity to shocks, the Resilience Index intends to identify 
factors that have increased the capacity of many EMCs 
to absorb external shocks, and to respond effectively. 
Put differently, while individual EMCs may be confronted 
with similar external shocks, the more resilient ones will 
be expected to be able to absorb the shock, respond 
effectively, and recover faster than the others.
In addition to the typical “fundamentals,” i.e., the 
strength or soundness of fiscal and monetary policies 
and the soundness of the financial system, the Centennial 
Resilience Index created for this paper includes important 
“structural aspects” of the economy, e.g., the quality of 
its civil service, governance, export dependency, external 
robustness, the extent to which private sector debt is 
externally financed, and the relative size of its interna-
tional reserves (see Box 2).7 These fundamentals give a 
measure of the capacity and the space that policymak-
ers have to design and implement needed adjustment 
measures, the confidence to implement such measures, 
and the credibility they have with the public and markets 
regarding their likely effectiveness. Some of the structural 
aspects also provide the capacity or flexibility for the 
economy itself to respond effectively to those policy 




































































































The Centennial Resilience Index provides inter alia a measure of the capacity of an economy to bounce back after having been hit by an 
external shock.   
The rationale for each of its elements and components is briefly described below:
Fiscal Policy Soundness
This represents the space policy makers have to adopt fiscal measures. Its components are the stock of public debt in relation to GDP as 
well as the rate (and direction) of change of this variable as a measure of the overall deficit. Beyond some thresholds a higher debt ratio 
or overall deficit decreases the space.
Monetary Policy Soundness
The greater the credibility the central bank has built up – for example, by such actions as controlling inflation, the more room the central 
bank has to ease monetary policy in a slowdown, thereby supporting activity in the economy. Its components are the difference between 
domestic inflation and G-7 inflation, whether an inflation targeting framework is in place (as they are typically associated with increased 
credibility), and a measure of the unpredictability of inflation, estimated by its historical standard deviation.
Government Effectiveness
The stronger the capacity of government officials to react and design policies, the better and faster will be the implementation of these 
policies and thus the response of the economy. The greater the capacity of the government to follow through with its plans, the more 
likely the private sector will respond positively to stimulus measures, and thus the higher the country’s resilience. Its components are the 
quality of the bureaucracy and the ability to consistently implement forward-looking policies.
Overall Governance
Good governance is generally seen as a necessary underpinning to an efficient economy, with reliable and independent institutions, 
adherence to the rule of law (confidence in contracts, property rights, etc.), transparency, limits to corruption, press freedom, required 
bank and credit ratings, accounting disclosure,  shareholder rights, and availability of both private- and public-sector standardized data. 
Its components are indices of corporate governance, legal system, and policy transparency, and are taken from the Index of Financial 
Development and Strength developed by Centennial Group International (see methodology).
Bank Soundness 
A sounder financial system with less risk of default, a strong capital base, well-provisioned assets, non-volatile income sources, and 
high profitability is less likely to amplify an external shock and thus make the economy more resilient. Although this element represents 
predominantly banks, it also includes some non-bank financial institutions, and therefore measures the broader financial sector. Its 
components—all derived from the IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide1 — are asset quality, capital base, and 
income risk, and are also taken from the Index of Financial Development and Strength developed by Centennial Group International.
Export Diversity
The more diversified the export base, the more resilient the economy is likely to be. Although this should apply to both export 
destinations and products, appropriate data for the latter is not readily available. Its component is the coefficient of variation of export 
shares by destination.
Export Independence
The greater the dependence on exports, the less resilient to an external shock an economy is likely to be. Its component is the ratio of 
exports to GDP.
External Robustness 
The stronger the external sector, the more resilient an economy is likely to be. Its components are the current account balance as a 
proportion of GDP, the ratio of international reserves to short term debt, the stock of reserves in terms of months of imports, and a 
classification of the exchange rate regime. 
Private External Debt
The faster the expansion of externally financed credit to the private sector, the less resilient an economy is likely to be to a sudden stop 
in capital flows. (Externally financed credit should not be seen as financial deepening, which involves credit growth mainly financed by 
domestic financial savings.) Its components are the change in the ratio of loans from foreign banks to private credit by domestic banks, 
the ratio of claims on the country’s residents by foreign banks to GDP, and the change in this ratio. It would have been helpful and 
appropriate to include currency composition of private sector debt, but the relevant data was not available.
International Reserves
At least up to some limit, the higher the reserve holdings the stronger the self-insurance they offer; in addition, a high stock of reserves 
provides policy makers with room for maneuver and confidence to adopt expansionary policies in a downturn. Thus, a high stock of 
reserves constitutes a buffer against external shocks. While it would appear that the higher the stock of reserves, the better off the 
country is, Box 1 notes the costs of such an approach. Moreover, a recent IMF study  shows that the self-insurance aspect tapers off 
after a certain level of reserves. The measure of this element of the resilience index is the ratio of international reserves to GDP.
1  International Monetary Fund. (2006). Financial soundness indicators : compilation guide. Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund.








































































































The potential attractiveness of the Index is that it 
gives a comprehensive, general-equilibrium type of view 
of the resilience of an economy; it shows how all the 
relevant factors interact and reinforce (or weaken)8 each 
other.  For instance, the resilience index of a country with 
strong fundamentals but weak structural aspects (e.g., 
fast-growing externally financed private debt, or highly 
concentrated export destinations) may be lower than the 
index of a country with average fundamentals but strong 
structural aspects. Importantly, the elements of the Index 
can give policymakers a good idea of the sources of 
their country’s resilience and where they need to con-
sider focusing further reform efforts. 
The Index suggests that the resilience of many of 
the EMCs was considerably stronger at the onset of the 
recent global crisis than it had been in the past (Figure 
8  This comprehensive approach is what differentiates the Centennial 
Resilience Index from the traditional vulnerability measures as they tend to be more of a 
partial-equilibrium nature..
7).9 This reflects the significant reforms that many EMCs 
have implemented with considerable rigor since the 
mid-1990s to strengthen macroeconomic policymak-
ing frameworks, regulatory and supervisory regimes, 
accounting standards, legal frameworks, and data 
reporting systems, and in transparency more generally. 
On this basis, it is likely that these countries’ perform-
ances would have been much weaker had policymakers 
not introduced such reforms and not increased the resil-
ience of their countries beyond what it had been in 1997. 
It is worth noting that even if the shock itself resulted in 
some decline in the Centennial Resilience Index for 2008, 
e.g., by reducing reserves, increasing fiscal deficits and 
debt levels, and the like, policymakers in many of these 
countries (notably in PRC, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Israel, Jordan, South Africa, and Thailand) quickly 
responded and, as a result, their economies recovered 
9  Given the complexities of the various elements of the Resilience Index and 
of the statistical methodology (factor analysis), it is important to stress that the individual 
numbers are influenced by the sample of countries under review, i.e., they indicate relative 
positions or values across only those countries and years included in the sample.
Source: Centennial Group International.












Resilience Index Score 1. Fiscal Policy Soundness Score




































































































Source: Centennial Group International.












Resilience Index Score 3. Monetary Policy Soundness Score
5. Bank Soundness Score 9. Private Sector External Debt Score
Source: Centennial Group International.












Resilience Index Score 6. Export Diversity Score
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Azerbaijan 104.5 0.2 114.5 0.0 87.9 0.3 90.8 0.2 85.2 0.5
Bangladesh 90.4 0.2 102.5 0.0 91.1 0.5 98.2 0.1 89.1 0.5
PRC 109.8 0.2 108.5 0.0 97.4 0.1 100.9 0.1 92.8 0.3
Georgia 109.7 0.2 111.3 0.0 107.7 0.3 98.9 0.1 94.9 0.5
Hong Kong, 
China 104.5 0.4 115.8 0.0 119.3 0.7 103.9 0.2 116.5 0.9
India 108.8 0.2 94.4 0.0 104.7 0.2 103.3 0.2 101.3 0.2
Indonesia 104.0 0.2 105.8 0.0 95.3 0.2 104.4 0.4 96.9 0.2
Kazakhstan 97.0 0.2 114.6 0.0 91.1 0.5 91.8 0.1 99.6 0.7
Rep. of Korea 111.3 0.2 104.5 0.0 115.2 0.5 109.9 0.4 109.8 0.2
Malaysia 110.1 0.2 101.7 0.0 115.2 0.5 105.3 0.2 104.8 0.3
Pakistan 101.9 0.2 99.8 0.0 95.3 0.2 102.3 0.2 96.9 0.5
Philippines 112.0 0.2 103.0 0.0 108.9 0.2 109.2 0.4 101.4 0.5
Singapore 109.7 0.3 91.5 0.0 128.8 0.9 103.3 0.1 115.7 0.5
Sri Lanka 92.2 0.2 92.8 0.0 95.3 0.2 92.3 0.1 104.5 0.5
Thailand 110.7 0.2 104.2 0.0 101.6 0.1 109.6 0.4 104.0 0.2
Viet Nam 90.4 0.2 99.5 0.0 97.4 0.1 97.5 0.1 87.2 0.5
Emerging Europe/CIS
Czech Republic 98.3 0.2 105.7 0.0 115.2 0.5 107.8 0.4 107.7 0.3
Hungary 93.3 0.2 94.0 0.0 113.1 0.4 106.7 0.4 111.0 0.3
Latvia 91.5 0.2 114.1 0.0 105.2 0.1 95.9 0.1 105.8 0.3
Lithuania 98.2 0.2 110.0 0.0 111.5 0.5 100.2 0.1 112.9 0.3
Poland 103.4 0.2 100.7 0.0 113.1 0.4 108.9 0.4 105.1 0.3
Romania 95.2 0.2 109.0 0.0 96.3 0.3 107.3 0.4 102.3 0.2
Russia 115.8 0.2 114.8 0.0 90.0 0.3 99.2 0.1 97.6 0.2
Slovak Republic 97.1 0.2 107.2 0.0 115.2 0.5 105.1 0.2 107.1 0.3
Slovenia 98.8 0.3 108.0 0.0 117.3 0.6 107.9 0.4 107.8 0.4
Turkey 108.2 0.2 105.1 0.0 103.6 0.2 107.1 0.4 99.8 0.2
Ukraine 92.8 0.1 113.2 0.0 87.9 0.3 95.3 0.1 90.8 0.3
Latin America
Argentina 112.4 0.2 103.6 0.0 102.6 0.3 92.4 0.1 108.2 0.5
Bolivia 106.8 0.3 107.1 0.0 93.2 0.4 97.3 0.1 102.2 0.5
The Centennial Resilience Indices and their Elements for 2007
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Azerbaijan 102.9 0.1 104.0 0.0 105.5 0.0 117.6 0.4 111.0 0.2 96.6 0.0
Bangladesh 83.6 0.4 98.3 0.0 107.6 0.0 99.5 0.2 103.9 0.1 92.6 0.0
PRC 94.7 0.2 105.2 0.0 98.2 0.0 120.5 0.6 101.7 0.1 114.4 0.0
Georgia 115.7 0.3 106.6 0.0 108.5 0.0 87.7 0.4 106.1 0.1 96.8 0.0
Hong Kong, 
China 100.9 0.1 84.4 0.0 60.3 0.0 104.1 0.2 82.2 0.4 128.3 0.0
India 98.0 0.2 114.3 0.0 108.0 0.0 107.7 0.4 96.3 0.1 103.0 0.0
Indonesia 104.1 0.1 104.1 0.0 101.4 0.0 102.3 0.1 103.5 0.1 96.4 0.0
Kazakhstan 105.5 0.1 105.3 0.0 93.4 0.0 94.2 0.2 95.9 0.1 98.1 0.0
Rep. of Korea 99.4 0.2 104.1 0.0 98.0 0.0 103.2 0.2 91.7 0.1 104.1 0.0
Malaysia 95.7 0.1 105.5 0.0 77.9 0.0 112.9 0.3 97.2 0.1 119.5 0.0
Pakistan 101.2 0.1 107.7 0.0 108.3 0.0 100.1 0.2 100.6 0.1 94.5 0.0
Philippines 102.1 0.2 101.2 0.0 98.2 0.0 103.9 0.1 112.6 0.2 101.6 0.0
Singapore 101.2 0.1 107.2 0.0 59.7 0.0 112.3 0.4 78.5 0.3 135.8 0.0
Sri Lanka 97.1 0.2 98.6 0.0 102.9 0.0 94.2 0.2 99.9 0.1 94.9 0.0
Thailand 96.2 0.1 110.0 0.0 88.0 0.0 110.2 0.3 104.2 0.1 109.5 0.0
Viet Nam 94.2 0.2 103.6 0.0 86.0 0.0 96.2 0.2 95.9 0.1 108.7 0.0
Emerging Europe/CIS
Czech Republic 98.8 0.1 98.3 0.0 82.5 0.0 94.3 0.2 82.7 0.3 101.0 0.0
Hungary 102.4 0.1 101.4 0.0 86.0 0.0 88.7 0.4 73.9 0.4 99.4 0.0
Latvia 101.6 0.2 104.8 0.0 101.4 0.0 81.2 0.5 59.4 0.5 100.6 0.0
Lithuania 98.9 0.2 107.3 0.0 94.6 0.0 88.0 0.3 69.5 0.4 100.7 0.0
Poland 100.6 0.1 102.7 0.0 99.4 0.0 96.4 0.1 87.4 0.2 97.8 0.0
Romania 101.2 0.1 105.1 0.0 103.1 0.0 89.6 0.4 66.9 0.5 102.2 0.0
Russia 109.6 0.1 113.9 0.0 101.4 0.0 116.4 0.6 102.5 0.1 110.2 0.0
Slovak Republic 99.0 0.1 103.7 0.0 83.1 0.0 92.7 0.2 73.1 0.4 103.4 0.0
Slovenia 98.6 0.1 106.0 0.0 90.1 0.0 89.5 0.4 72.7 0.4 97.8 0.0
Turkey 106.2 0.1 115.0 0.0 106.3 0.0 94.3 0.2 95.9 0.1 95.5 0.0
Ukraine 98.0 0.1 103.8 0.0 98.3 0.0 98.3 0.1 86.5 0.2 102.4 0.0
Latin America
Argentina 105.3 0.2 108.4 0.0 104.1 0.0 109.2 0.3 110.6 0.1 99.2 0.0
Bolivia 102.0 0.0 86.8 0.0 98.7 0.0 121.8 0.7 105.6 0.1 109.3 0.0
The Centennial Resilience Indices and their Elements for 2007
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1. This indicator overestimates the actual private sector externally financed debt in countries considered as international financial centers, such as Singapore, Panama, 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Brazil 113.5 0.2 95.8 0.0 99.5 0.0 109.0 0.4 104.3 0.2
Chile 117.5 0.3 115.5 0.0 117.3 0.6 105.9 0.4 125.0 0.6
Colombia 106.2 0.2 105.6 0.0 101.6 0.1 108.9 0.4 101.5 0.2
Costa Rica 101.5 0.1 107.4 0.0 103.6 0.2 99.0 0.1 109.0 0.3
Dominican 
Republic 91.3 0.2 109.0 0.0 92.1 0.2 100.4 0.1 99.1 0.2
Ecuador 95.4 0.3 108.3 0.0 91.1 0.5 104.9 0.2 105.2 0.5
Mexico 100.9 0.2 103.1 0.0 108.9 0.2 110.2 0.4 110.4 0.5
Panama 81.4 0.3 102.2 0.0 105.7 0.4 101.7 0.1 94.3 0.2
Peru 113.0 0.2 106.9 0.0 99.5 0.0 109.1 0.4 110.3 0.5
Uruguay 115.1 0.2 99.7 0.0 105.7 0.4 100.7 0.1 121.5 0.5
Venezuela 94.2 0.2 106.6 0.0 85.9 0.4 91.7 0.1 91.1 0.6
Middle East & North Africa
Bahrain 98.3 0.3 111.1 0.0 105.7 0.4 104.0 0.2 100.4 0.3
Egypt 101.6 0.2 93.6 0.0 97.4 0.1 100.6 0.1 103.6 0.5
Israel 108.5 0.2 94.9 0.0 120.4 0.5 109.2 0.4 108.4 0.3
Jordan 105.9 0.2 96.6 0.0 101.6 0.1 102.7 0.1 102.6 0.2
Lebanon 97.4 0.2 74.2 0.0 91.1 0.5 100.7 0.1 92.5 0.5
Morocco 107.6 0.1 98.9 0.0 101.6 0.1 105.3 0.2 99.7 0.2
Saudi Arabia 120.3 0.3 116.3 0.0 99.5 0.0 101.2 0.1 96.0 0.5
Tunisia 99.6 0.1 101.4 0.0 103.6 0.2 103.4 0.2 102.1 0.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana 126.0 23.6 113.7 0.0 105.7 0.4 101.0 0.1 104.4 0.3
Côte d'Ivoire 87.6 0.7 93.8 0.0 78.5 0.6 105.8 0.2 83.9 0.3
Ethiopia 102.4 0.8 113.4 0.0 89.5 0.4 97.2 0.1 87.8 2.6
Ghana 108.5 0.5 105.0 0.0 105.2 0.1 103.9 0.4 98.6 1.7
Kenya 100.6 0.2 100.1 0.0 93.2 0.4 102.7 0.2 84.7 0.3
Nigeria 105.3 0.3 117.2 0.0 87.9 0.3 101.2 0.1 84.8 0.3
Senegal 96.5 0.1 110.4 0.0 87.9 0.3 101.5 0.1 92.7 0.2
South Africa 104.9 0.2 107.1 0.0 107.8 0.5 105.3 0.4 108.2 0.3
Tanzania 104.6 0.1 106.5 0.0 90.0 0.3 102.6 0.2 87.4 0.3
Uganda 109.2 0.2 115.9 0.0 93.2 0.4 101.9 0.1 84.3 0.3
Zambia 96.8 0.2 128.9 0.0 87.9 0.3 98.6 0.1 85.7 0.3
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Brazil 111.8 0.2 111.5 0.0 108.7 0.0 109.5 0.5 100.5 0.0 96.7 0.0
Chile 103.2 0.1 106.1 0.0 95.6 0.0 97.1 0.3 101.0 0.1 94.8 0.0
Colombia 105.4 0.1 92.5 0.0 107.5 0.0 100.9 0.1 103.4 0.1 94.5 0.0
Costa Rica 107.2 0.1 99.5 0.0 97.9 0.0 92.9 0.2 90.5 0.1 98.3 0.0
Dominican 
Republic 107.9 0.1 76.3 0.0 111.4 0.0 87.8 0.4 93.3 0.1 92.0 0.0
Ecuador 97.1 0.5 88.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 94.4 0.4 102.5 0.1 92.0 0.0
Mexico 111.2 0.2 68.2 0.0 101.7 0.0 97.5 0.2 98.3 0.0 93.6 0.0
Panama 103.6 0.1 91.2 0.0 111.7 0.0 81.8 0.8 48.1 0.7 94.5 0.0
Peru 106.6 0.1 104.4 0.0 102.0 0.0 108.5 0.4 94.5 0.1 104.1 0.0
Uruguay 104.9 0.1 109.2 0.0 105.3 0.0 101.4 0.2 105.4 0.1 99.3 0.0
Venezuela 110.3 0.2 78.7 0.0 100.0 0.0 108.0 0.2 112.4 0.2 95.1 0.0
Middle East & North Africa
Bahrain 102.1 0.1 113.7 0.0 84.5 0.0 99.0 0.7 68.3 0.6 105.3 0.0
Egypt 88.2 0.2 109.1 0.0 108.3 0.0 107.6 0.4 94.4 0.1 103.0 0.0
Israel 95.4 0.2 94.2 0.0 99.3 0.0 104.9 0.2 104.0 0.1 99.2 0.0
Jordan 107.3 0.3 99.6 0.0 99.3 0.0 96.2 0.3 101.2 0.1 113.7 0.0
Lebanon 96.9 0.3 101.2 0.0 108.9 0.0 103.7 0.4 103.5 0.1 118.3 0.0
Morocco 97.2 0.1 96.2 0.0 105.4 0.0 109.7 0.4 104.7 0.1 108.1 0.0
Saudi Arabia 110.4 0.3 104.4 0.0 88.5 0.0 131.2 0.9 93.1 0.2 130.7 0.0
Tunisia 91.1 0.1 92.4 0.0 96.7 0.0 102.3 0.2 104.3 0.1 101.2 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana 100.0 0.1 103.6 82.9 95.0 0.0 136.2 1.3 101.3 0.0 130.6 0.0
Côte d'Ivoire 96.0 0.1 105.8 0.0 95.9 0.0 100.7 2.5 99.5 0.1 96.4 0.0
Ethiopia 98.7 0.2 109.8 0.0 111.3 0.0 102.9 0.7 105.5 0.1 92.3 0.0
Ghana 109.1 0.2 112.3 0.0 100.8 0.0 90.3 0.2 105.2 0.1 99.5 0.0
Kenya 105.7 0.1 109.6 0.0 107.5 0.0 97.7 0.1 105.2 0.1 95.7 0.0
Nigeria 109.0 0.5 86.6 0.0 96.4 0.0 121.7 0.6 106.2 0.1 107.5 0.0
Senegal 96.1 0.1 102.6 0.0 107.3 0.0 95.1 0.2 96.4 0.1 97.7 0.0
South Africa 101.1 0.2 111.6 0.0 102.7 0.0 93.1 0.2 85.3 0.2 94.9 0.0
Tanzania 103.9 0.1 113.0 0.0 108.5 0.0 99.5 0.2 105.3 0.1 99.3 0.0
Uganda 113.6 0.2 107.6 0.0 108.0 0.0 104.4 0.3 101.4 0.1 102.0 0.0
Zambia 108.5 0.2 89.3 0.0 95.2 0.0 92.8 0.2 107.5 0.1 94.3 0.0
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much of their resilience in 2009.
Table 6 and Figure 7 present the resilience indices 
and their elements for the individual countries in the 
sample for 2007, the year prior to the external shock. 
It is possible to see that different strengths contribute 
to the highest resilience indices, and vice versa. For 
example, while for Chile most of the elements contributed 
roughly equally to the strength of its resilience, for PRC 
and Russia, the index suggests that their resilience 
derives primarily from fiscal policy soundness, external 
robustness, and international reserves. For Brazil, the 
key elements are bank soundness and export robust-
ness. For India, they are large and stable domestic 
consumption, export independence, external robustness, 
and conservative banking practices. For Malaysia and 
Singapore, they are government effectiveness, external 
robustness, and international reserves. And for Uruguay, 
governance, private sector external indebtedness, and 
bank soundness are key. By contrast, despite their 
strong fiscal policy soundness, Latvia’s and Romania’s 
resilience was lowered mainly by the growing private sec-
tor external indebtedness and low external robustness. 
Similarly, Mexico’s resilience was considerably reduced 
by the large concentration of exports to the US and 
internal market rigidities, despite strong fiscal policy and 
bank soundness; Viet Nam’s resilience was low despite 
relatively sound fiscal and monetary policies and high 
international reserves.
Over the past twelve years, all regions have improved 
their resilience scores, with a temporary dip in 2008 (see 
Figures A61 – A71).  Until 2004, Asia and the Middle East 
and North Africa shared the highest scores in the index 
and trended in the same direction.  But since 2004, the 
Middle East has outperformed even Asia, in addition 
to the others.  The laggard throughout the past twelve 
years has been Latin America, which has trailed all other 
regions.  Emerging Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa have 
been trending upward, but their resilience scores remain 
below average.
Figure 8 shows the Asian countries’ distance from 
the mean 2009 resilience score in terms of standard 
deviations.  The majority of the Asian countries in the 
sample have above average resilience scores.  Figures 
9 through 24 show how each Asian country’s resilience 
index elements compare to the 2009 means for those 
elements, also in terms of standard deviations.  These 
measurements can be used to determine the areas in 
which countries are succeeding or lagging.
The index results for PRC raise a number of inter-
esting questions.  The overall score is above average, 
as one would expect, and it is bolstered by relatively 
very high scores for reserves and external robustness. 
However, the extremely large build-up of reserves may 
have other costs not captured by the Index – and may 
not be sustainable; similarly, the measure of external 
robustness may reflect, in part, an unsustainable current 
account position. In contrast, PRC’s capacity to imple-
ment policies is recognized by many as exceptionally 
strong. But that is not fully reflected in some of the other 
elements included in the Index, such as those for govern-
ment effectiveness. Similarly, the scores on banking 
soundness pull down the overall index measure. Further 
work is needed to determine if the way in which some 
of the elements are constructed and measured fully 
captures the strengths of a system like PRC’s that differs 
in many ways from the systems in which, and for which, 
many of the underlying measures were developed.
V. The Resilience Index’s Application to the Crisis
Does the Centennial Resilience Index help explain 
why the rebound in growth in the wake of the crisis, 
as measured by the actual economic growth for the 
individual countries since late 2009 or early 2010,10  has 
10  This is measured as the annualized growth rate for the two quarters 
following the first four quarters that began with the onset of the crisis in each country. In 
this paper, those two quarters are referred to as the “recovery” or “post-crisis” period. The 
four quarters that began with the onset of the crisis in each country are referred to as the 
“during-crisis” period. The four quarters before the during-crisis period are termed the 
“pre-crisis” period. For 12 of the countries—Argentina, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Lithuania, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Viet Nam—
the during-crisis period was defined as 2009 Q1 to 2009 Q4 and the second period as 
2010 Q1 to 2010 Q2. For 26 countries—Brazil, Chile, PRC, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech 
Republic, Ecuador, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Republic of 
Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Thailand, and Turkey—the during-crisis period was defined as 2008 Q1 to 2009 





































































































Source: Centennial Group International.




Source: Centennial Group International.
Azerbaijan: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
9
Source: Centennial Group International.
Bangladesh: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
10
Source: Centennial Group International.
PRC: Elements’ Deviation from the Mean
Figure
11
Source: Centennial Group International.




Source: Centennial Group International.
Hong Kong, China: Elements’ 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Centennial Group International.




Source: Centennial Group International.
Indonesia: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
15
Source: Centennial Group International.
Kazakhstan: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
16
Source: Centennial Group International.
Republic of Korea: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
17
Source: Centennial Group International.




Source: Centennial Group International.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Centennial Group International.
Philippines: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
20
Source: Centennial Group International.
Singapore: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
21
Source: Centennial Group International.
Sir Lanka: Elements’ 
Deviation from the Mean
Figure
22
Source: Centennial Group International.




Source: Centennial Group International.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































varied across EMCs? This will be one key test of the 
usefulness of the index. Some of these countries have 
grown very fast and are expected to grow at around 
10 percent annually in 2010 and 2011 while others are 
expected to register barely any growth. Thus, in an 
attempt to link the recovery that followed the shock to 
the countries’ resilience as measured by the Centennial 
Resilience Index, we first regress the average annualized 
growth rate during the two-quarter recovery period10 as 
a function of the Resilience Index of 2007 (i.e., just prior 
to the crisis), as shown in Table 7 and Figure 25. In this 
regression, illustrated by Figure 25, the coefficient for the 
index is quite robust, significant at the 99 percent level, 
and the R-squared indicates that the index alone explains 
some 45 percent of the variation in the rate of real GDP 
growth. Moreover the coefficient of the index suggests 
that raising a country’s index by one point would lead to 
an increase of nearly one half of one percent in real GDP 
growth in the period following the crisis. 
In the second regression, we added the real GDP 
growth rate during the crisis10 as an explanatory variable. 
During a crisis, one would be able to use this information 
in addition to the resilience index to predict post-crisis 
growth. Its coefficient is significant at the 99 percent 
level, while the coefficient for the Index remains signifi-
cant at the same level. Here, an increase in the resilience 
index of one point is associated with an increased 
recovery growth rate of over one third of a percentage 
point. Although the latter coefficient is somewhat lower 
than in the previous regression, the explanatory power of 
this regression increases: now the model explains almost 
two thirds of the variation in the recovery-period real GDP 
growth.
In the third regression, we add the monetary stimulus 
(as measured by the change in the ratio to GDP of credit 
to the private sector in 2009) and the pre-crisis growth. 
The explanatory power of this regression increases 
further, to 80 percent, while the resilience coefficient 
suggests that an increase of one point in the index is 
associated with an increased post-crisis GDP growth of 
a country of almost half of one percent. The coefficients 
for the resilience index, for the during-crisis growth, and 
for the monetary stimulus are robust, significant at the 
99 percent level. We include the pre-crisis growth rate 
among the explanatory variables both to test that it is not 
significant as a predictor of post-crisis growth and as a 
point of comparison for the next set of regressions, in 
which it is included. Although not shown, a regression 
using pre-crisis growth as a second explanatory variable 
in addition to only resilience also shows that pre-crisis 
growth is not significant as a predictor of post-crisis 
growth.
This regression also shows the positive relationship 
between monetary expansion and post-crisis growth. We 
have also tried to add the fiscal stimulus (as measured by 
the change in the ratio to GDP of the government’s total 
expenditure) but its coefficient was not significant. This is 
a puzzling result; perhaps it reflects the limited available 
time series of data for the recovery period (two quarters), 
which may be too short a period for the effects of the 
stimulus packages to materialize, given the typical lags in 
the effects of macroeconomic policy actions. 
For the second set regressions (4 through 7), the 
dependent variable is defined as the difference between 
the average real GDP growth rate for the two quarters 
after the crisis and the average growth rate for the four 
quarters before the crisis. Although the regressions lose 
some explanatory power, they remain robust. As shown 
in regression 4, using the resilience index as a sole inde-
pendent variable explains about 30 percent of the vari-
ation in the change in growth. Here, an increase of one 
point in the resilience score corresponds to an increase, 
relative to pre-crisis growth, of over a third of a point in 
post-crisis real GDP growth.
Adding the pre-crisis growth as a second explanatory 
variable (regression 5) increases the explanatory power 
of the model, which now explains about 43 percent of 
the variation in the difference between post- and pre-
crisis growth. The resilience coefficient remains robust, 
significant at the 99 percent level, and suggests that 
an increase of a country’s resilience index by one point 




































































































Source: Centennial Group International.
GDP Growth after the Crisis and the Centennial Resilience Index
Figure
25
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. The dependent variable is the annualized growth rate for the 
two quarters that followed the first four quarters that began with the onset of the crisis in the country (see footnote 10). Resilience Score is the value 
of the overall Resilience Index in the year 2007. During-Crisis Growth is the annualized growth rate during the first four quarters that began with the 
onset of the crisis in the country. Pre-Crisis Growth is the annualized growth rate for the four quarters that preceded the during-crisis period. Private 
Credit Expansion is the difference between the ratios in 2008 and 2009 of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP.  Country data availability 
for these regressions and and the timing of the pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis periods for each country are given in footnote 10. Azerbaijan, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey were included in the first two regressions but excluded from the 
third because their 2009 data for private credit from deposit money banks was not yet available.
***Significant at the 1% level.







































































































Source: Centennial Group International.
Difference between pre- and post- Crisis GDP Growth
Figure
26
Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. The dependent variable is the difference between the post-
crisis and pre-crisis growth rates, defined as follows: The post-crisis growth rate is the annualized rate for the two quarters (post-crisis period) that 
followed the first four quarters (during-crisis period) that began with the onset of the crisis in the country (see footnote 10). The pre-crisis growth rate 
is the annualized rate for the the four quarters that preceded the during-crisis period. Resilience Score is the value of the overall Resilience Index in 
the year 2007. During-Crisis Growth is the annualized growth rate for the above-mentioned during-crisis period. Pre-Crisis Growth is the growth rate 
for the above-mentioned pre-crisis period. Private Credit Expansion is the difference between the ratios in 2008 and 2009 of private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP.  Country data availability for these regressions and and the timing of the pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis periods for 
each country are given in footnote 10. Azerbaijan, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey were included in 
the first two regressions but excluded from the third because their 2009 data for private credit from deposit money banks was not yet available. 
**Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.






































































































percent in the change in GDP. Note that the coefficient 
for pre-crisis growth here, also significant, is negative. 
This suggests that in the sample of countries considered, 
those countries that grew faster than others before the 
crisis experienced a sharper drop in post-crisis growth 
relative to their pre-crisis levels..
The sixth regression, similar to the fifth, adds during-
crisis growth (defined in footnote 10) as an explanatory 
variable. As before, the resilience coefficient and pre-
crisis growth coefficient are significant at the 99 percent 
level, as is the coefficient for the during-crisis growth. As 
in regression 5, the coefficient for the pre-crisis growth 
is negative, suggesting that, on average, the countries 
that grew faster before the crisis experienced, after the 
crisis, larger falls relative to their pre-crisis levels. And as 
in regression 2 and 3, the coefficient for the during-crisis 
growth is significant and positive, showing that the better 
countries did during the crisis, the better they did after 
the crisis. The explanatory power of this sixth model 
jumps further compared to the previous two regressions 
for this dependent variable: This model explains almost 
two-thirds of the variation in the difference between post- 
and pre-crisis real GDP growth.
In the last regression, as in regression 3, we add 
the monetary expansion, which is also significant at the 
99 percent level. The explanatory power of this model 
rises further: it explains about 75 percent of the change 
in growth. The coefficient for the resilience score is also 
strong: here, a one-point increase in the index corre-
sponds to an increase in GDP growth, relative to the pre-
crisis growth rate, of about .42 percent after the crisis.
VI. Conclusion
Perhaps the most important conclusion of this study is 
that the significant reforms introduced in many emerg-
ing market countries in the wake of the crises of the 
1990s and early 2000s have paid significant dividends. 
And these dividends have redounded not only to those 
economies but to the global system. Without such 
reforms, the capacity of many of the EMCs  to confront 
the challenges posed by the current crisis would have 
been much weaker. In turn, the significant contributions 
made by the EMCs to stabilizing the global economy and 
bolstering the strength of the global recovery would also 
have been much weaker. 
This experience has opened a new chapter in the role 
of the EMCs in the global system. In the past, a shock 
wave from the advanced economies typically hit the 
shores of the emerging market and developing countries, 
with significant negative impact on their economies. As 
waves are carried back across the seas, the weaken-
ing of the EMCs from the initial shock redounded back 
to aggravate the slowdown in the more developed 
economies. Another self-aggravating dynamic of crises! 
However, that dynamic appears now to be much more 
limited, or even reversed. The new policy capacities of 
the EMCs allows them to absorb the shock and even to 
counter and help reverse the global impact of the original 
disturbance in the more developed world.
The Resilience Index developed for this paper helps 
explain and quantify the forces behind this new reality. It 
should help provide guidance both to the EMCs that have 
already made significant strides in strengthening their 
economies as well as to those lagging in such reforms. 
Further work may help to better identify those particular 
areas in which the greatest return can be expected from 
further reform efforts.  
This happy story helps explain the significant con-
tribution of the EMCs to moderating the global impact 
of the financial crisis and helping to spur the recovery. 
However, much remains to be done. While many of the 
EMCs – especially the largest ones – have recovered to 
near their pre-crisis rates of growth, the underlying imbal-
ances in the global system are reappearing. Thus, while 
the strength of their contribution to the global recovery 
is to be welcomed, the reemergence of unsustainable 
imbalances is surely problematic. Together with other 
developments, these imbalances are manifesting them-
selves in exchange rate tensions that, if left uncorrected, 






































































































As shown in the diagram on the next page, the Resilience 
index is calculated by aggregating ten subindices known 
as elements, each of which aggregates underlying vari-
ables. In the diagram, the number in parentheses states 
how many underlying variables are used to compute that 
element. (Where there is no number in parentheses, that 
element equals the average of the sub-elements beneath 
it, which have been normalized.)
Unless there is only one variable in an element, factor 
analysis is used to generate the score. The data sample 
for which scores are calculated and later analyzed (59 
countries from 1997–2009) is the same as the sample 
used to generate the factors. We use the principal-com-
ponent factor method to identify the unobserved latent 
variables, with the constraint that the factor analysis 
should not use more than two such factors. Then, except 
in the case of income risk, we perform a varimax rotation. 
We then drop the second factor and take the first factor 
to be our score for the element. 
We also generate standard errors for each measure-
ment so that users may identify which differences in 
scores are meaningful and which are not. For all of these, 
we use a maximum-likelihood factor analysis, a varimax 
rotation, and a bordered information matrix with analytic 
derivatives. These standard errors incorporate two 
uncertainties: The first reflects our imperfect estimates to 
fill in missing data. The second reflects how well the fac-
tor model fits the indicators: this derives from the intrinsic 
problem, even with perfect data, of measuring such 
difficult-to-pin-down concepts as resilience on a single 
numerical scale with necessarily imperfect indicators.
For a more detailed explanation of the statistical 
methodology and coding, see the Centennial Index of 
Financial Development and Strength, from which these 
are taken.11 
11  Sundararajan, V. S., H. A. Kohli, C. Loser, H. Kohli, & A. Goldstein. (2008). 
“Centennial Group and Emerging Markets present The 2008 FDS Index: Index of Financial 
Development and Stability.” Emerging Markets Newspaper, Euromoney, 2008/10/10.
     Kohli, H. (2009). “Centennial Group & Emerging Markets present The 2009 FDS Index: 
Index of financial development & strength.” Emerging Markets Newspaper, Euromoney, 
2009/10/06.
     Kohli, H. A., V. S. Sundararajan, et al. (2012). Unpublished. “An Index of Financial 
Development: Measuring and Comparing Financial Depth, Efficiency, and Openness Across  Countries and Years.”
(Numbers in parentheses indicate how many variables (components) 
of raw data go into each element.)



























































































































































































































































































































































































Abbreviations for data sources
BIS    BIS Quarterly Review
BKSC    Bankscope
CBI    Central Bank of Iceland: “New Inflation Targeting Countries”
CIRI    Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database
DB    Doing Business
DOT    IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics
EIU    Economist Intelligence Unit
ERF    Economic Research Forum: Working Paper 395
EST    Centennial Estimate
EV    Econviews
FHFP    Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press
FIEFW    Fraser Institute’s’s Economic Freedom of the World
FSD    World Bank’s “A New Database on Financial Development and Structure”
GFSR    IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report
GIBR    Global Insight Business Risk and Conditions
HBSB    Harvard Business School Case: “Brazil 2003: Inflation Targeting & Debt Dynamics”
HF    Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom
IAERTR    International Advances in Economic Research: “Taylor Rule in Practice: Evidence from Turkey ” (2008)
IFS    IMF’s International Financial Statistics
IMFDSBB    IMF’s Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board
IMFFX    IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Frameworks
IMF267    IMF’s Occasional Paper 267
IMFS    IMF Survey Magazine
IRAE    International Review of Applied Economics: J. Jim (2008)
ITK    Yangu: Inflation Targeting in Kenya?
JMIB    Journal of Money, Investment, & Banking 2009: “Is Nigeria Ready for Inflation Targeting?”
PAC    Packard 2007: “Monetary Policy in Viet Nam”
PRS    Political Risk Services
RJEF    Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting: Daianu & Kallai (2008)
ROU    Roubini Global Economics
SG    Siregar & Goo 2008: “Inflation Targeting Policy”
TI    Transparency International
WBBR    World Bank’s Banking Regulation Survey
WDI    World Bank’s World Development Indicators
WEO    IMF’s World Economic Outlook (April 2010)
WGI    Worldwide Governance Indicators
* / ** indicates that a log transformation was applied to the variable: * represents log10(1+x) and ** represents log10(x)
Fiscal Policy Soundness
•	 WEO, EIU, IFS, WDI, & EST: Public debt to GDP*
•	 WEO, EIU, IFS, WDI, & EST: Change in Ratio of Public debt to GDP (Average over past 3 years)*
Government Effectiveness
•	 PRS: Score for Bureaucratic Quality, as calculated by the WGI for their Government Effectiveness subindex
•	 GIBR: Average of 2 scores: Policy Consistency/Forward Planning and Bureaucracy, as calculated by the WGI, as above
Monetary Policy
•	 WEO & EV: Inflation (Year-End CPI) minus the Average Inflation in G7 Countries*
•	 WEO & EV: Standard Deviation of Inflation (Year-End CPI) over past 3 years* 
•	 IMFS, IMF267, ITK, CBI, HBSB, PAC, IRAE, SG, RJEF, ROU, ERF, IAERTR, IMFFX, & EST: Is the country inflation targeting?
Corporate Governance
•	 WBBR: Sum of 2 questions: Must Banks Disclose Their Risk Management Procedures or Off-Balance Sheet Items to the Public?
•	 WBBR: Do Regulations Require Credit Ratings for Commercial Banks?
•	 DB: Credit Depth of Information Index
•	 FHFP: Sum of two Press Freedom Indicators: Economic Environment and Political Environment
•	 WBBR: Are the Following Bank Activities Rated? Bonds Issuance, Commercial Paper Issuance, Other activity (Certificates of 
Deposit, Pension & Mutual Funds, Insurance Companies, Financial Guarantees, etc)








































































































•	 GIBR: Red Tape & Bureaucratic Corruption score, as calculated by WGI for their Corruption sub-index
•	 GIBR: Average of 2 scores: Business Legislation & Tax Effectiveness, as calculated by WGI for their Regulatory Quality sub-index
•	 GIBR: Average of 2 scores: Judicial Independence & Business Crime Risk, as calculated by WGI for their Rule of Law sub-index
•	 CIRI: Independence of Judiciary
•	 DB: Legal Rights of Borrowers and Lenders Index
•	 HF: Property Rights
•	 FIEFW: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights
•	 DB: Sum of two Doing Business Indicators: Shareholder Suits & Director Liability
Policy Transparency
•	 TI: Corruption Perceptions Index
•	 FHFP: Laws & Regulations Influence on Media Content
•	 IMFDSBB: Does the country subscribe to the IMF’s Special or General Data Dissemination Standards
Asset Quality
•	 BKSC, GFSR, & WDI: Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans*
•	 BKSC:  Impaired Loans to Equity*
•	 BKSC, GFSR, & WDI: Bank Nonperforming Loans Net of Provisions to Total Loans* (floor set at -20%)
•	 BKSC, GFSR:  Impaired Loans Net of Provisions to Equity* (floor set at -20%)
Capital Base
•	 WBBR: Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is still non-performing?
•	 BKSC: Equity to Total Assets*
•	 BKSC: Equity to Net Loans*
•	 BKSC: Equity to Liabilities*
•	 BKSC: Equity to Deposits and Short-Term Funding*
Income Risk
•	 FSD, GFSR, & BKSC: Bank Return on Assets
•	 BKSC: Pre-Tax Operating Income to Average Assets*
•	 BKSC: Other Operating Income to Average Assets*
•	 BKSC: Net Interest Revenue to Average Assets*
•	 BKSC: Interest Margin to Gross Income*
•	 FSD & BKSC: Net Interest Margin (Accounting value of bank’s net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing assets)*
Export Diversity
•	 DOT & EST: Coefficient of Variation of Export Shares by Destination
Export Independence:
•	 IFS & WEO: Exports to GDP*
External Robustness
•	 WEO: Current Account Balance to GDP*
•	 BIS, IFS, & EST: Reserves to Short-Term Debt**
•	 IFS & EIU: Import Cover: Total Reserves Minus Gold to Months of Imports**
•	 IMFFX, WEO: Measure of Exchange Rate Regime’s Ability to Weather Crisis (Exchange Rate Regime adjusted for Reserves)
Private External Debt
•	 BIS & WEO: Change Over 3 Years in the Ratio of Total Foreign Claims of BIS-Reporting Banks to GDP* (floor set at -20%)
•	 BIS & WEO: Total Foreign Claims of BIS-Reporting Banks to GDP*
•	 BIS, IFS, & EST: Change Over 2 Years in the Ratio of Loans from BIS-Reporting Banks to Private Credit by Domestic Deposit 
Money Banks* (floor of -20%)
Reserves
•	 IFS, WEO, & EIU: Total Reserves Minus Gold to GDP*
Note: A two-year moving average was applied to all Asset Quality, Capital Base, and Income Risk variables.A three-year moving 
average was applied to the first and third Private External Debt variables. 
Note: The types of financial firms included in the Bankscope search criteria used for for all Bankscope data are Commerical Banks, 
Savings Banks, Cooperative Banks, Real Estate and Mortgage Banks, Islamic Banks, Other Non-Banking Credit Institutions, Micro-
Financing Institutions, and Credit Card, Factoring, and Leasing Finance Companies.






































































































Resilience Index and Element 
Scores by Country over Time
Annex
A




















Bank Soundness Score (Resilience Index)
Export Diversity Score (Resilience Index)
Export Independence Score (Resilience Index)
External Robustness Score (Resilience Index)
Fiscal Policy Soundness Score (Resilience Index)
Governance Score (Resilience Index)
Government Eﬀectiveness Score (Resilience Index)
Monetary Policy Soundness/Credibility Score (Resilience Index)
Private Sector Debt Score (Resilience Index)
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Azerbaijan 86.5 93.7 90.2 84.0 84.3 85.6 87.1 84.3 93.3 97.2 104.5 92.8 101.0
Bangladesh 88.6 87.1 85.0 81.9 83.7 85.6 87.1 87.4 87.9 89.1 90.4 92.0 96.3
PRC 102.1 101.4 101.2 99.4 101.2 102.9 100.8 101.5 105.2 108.6 109.8 113.0 115.2
Georgia 103.6 101.3 94.4 95.2 91.5 103.4 103.1 104.8 106.2 108.5 109.7 105.6 108.7
Hong Kong, 
China 107.1 107.2 111.4 113.1 111.8 112.4 109.1 103.5 103.8 103.2 104.5 105.8 108.7
India 101.8 98.0 100.5 102.1 103.9 105.3 106.0 105.1 106.1 107.0 108.8 105.8 105.4
Indonesia 79.5 45.2 54.7 79.5 98.0 101.6 103.9 102.9 99.9 101.6 104.0 103.3 108.6
Kazakhstan 96.6 100.9 98.8 99.3 98.1 98.7 98.6 100.6 100.9 102.5 97.0 102.9 97.6
Rep. of Korea 102.5 110.5 111.5 112.8 115.7 117.2 115.8 114.5 113.3 112.2 111.3 110.3 111.8
Malaysia 96.6 98.2 99.9 99.4 100.2 101.7 104.6 105.2 105.9 108.0 110.1 110.4 110.4
Pakistan 85.8 86.9 86.1 88.4 93.5 99.2 102.3 100.7 100.3 101.5 101.9 92.4 97.1
Philippines 89.3 90.7 92.6 96.7 97.6 99.0 101.6 97.2 100.4 105.3 112.0 111.8 112.5
Singapore 112.5 114.0 114.4 114.8 114.7 113.9 112.0 114.0 113.6 115.3 109.7 109.9 114.9
Sri Lanka 92.7 92.5 85.3 80.0 83.5 87.8 90.2 87.3 92.5 92.1 92.2 91.4 97.8
Thailand 91.8 91.4 95.2 100.0 102.1 107.9 105.3 106.1 104.6 107.0 110.7 110.8 112.7
Viet Nam 89.8 90.5 97.9 96.2 95.6 93.4 93.5 89.4 91.2 91.7 90.4 87.7 89.4
Emerging Europe/CIS
Czech Republic 97.7 99.9 101.2 98.9 97.4 100.9 101.4 101.9 105.4 103.1 98.3 104.4 103.9
Hungary 100.9 97.0 98.8 101.4 105.5 103.8 102.1 99.4 100.0 95.7 93.3 95.5 97.7
Latvia 106.4 104.1 104.0 105.7 104.5 105.7 101.9 100.5 97.1 90.9 91.5 96.5 106.9
Lithuania 98.5 100.9 102.7 104.2 104.7 109.0 108.7 104.2 104.4 99.1 98.2 99.1 103.0
Poland 107.6 108.1 106.7 105.1 104.1 104.3 104.0 102.6 106.9 106.1 103.4 103.3 103.3
Romania 69.6 85.8 84.6 93.8 98.2 101.1 100.9 101.6 101.2 97.8 95.2 98.3 103.5
Russia 88.2 72.9 74.7 99.5 108.7 113.6 111.9 112.7 114.0 115.0 115.8 111.2 114.2
Slovak Republic 90.1 87.8 88.4 95.8 95.7 99.7 98.1 98.1 101.6 98.4 97.1 99.4 91.5
Slovenia 107.4 107.2 106.2 104.9 105.9 107.6 108.0 107.8 105.6 103.0 98.8 101.8 103.6
Turkey 89.4 88.9 88.7 91.6 86.2 93.0 100.6 107.4 110.9 109.1 108.2 108.8 109.4
Ukraine 84.1 91.5 94.2 90.7 95.4 100.3 99.5 97.0 98.7 95.6 92.8 90.7 92.5
Latin America
Argentina 103.3 103.4 105.8 105.8 104.2 76.0 85.6 98.1 114.6 114.4 112.4 108.4 111.6
Bolivia 97.8 92.0 89.9 92.9 98.0 97.1 99.8 99.9 97.9 102.9 106.8 107.7 107.4




























































































































































Brazil 104.1 104.2 103.8 104.3 102.1 102.3 108.2 110.6 112.2 112.2 113.5 112.6 112.1
Chile 118.9 117.4 118.3 118.1 119.2 120.6 121.3 122.7 124.4 124.2 117.5 116.6 115.1
Colombia 98.0 93.9 94.9 97.0 101.6 103.1 104.1 107.8 107.6 105.6 106.2 105.7 108.4
Costa Rica 105.1 102.2 103.2 101.0 100.3 98.4 99.4 98.5 100.5 101.0 101.5 101.2 105.0
Dominican 
Republic 90.5 91.4 90.9 86.6 89.9 82.9 74.3 82.4 92.0 93.2 91.3 91.7 95.5
Ecuador 90.3 83.3 82.1 76.0 80.3 79.9 89.7 91.9 91.4 91.0 95.4 94.7 100.6
Mexico 85.4 88.1 90.9 94.5 94.4 95.2 98.0 99.8 101.7 102.0 100.9 98.5 97.6
Panama 92.7 92.0 91.2 94.0 95.1 92.9 87.2 87.1 87.5 82.7 81.4 80.8 94.9
Peru 109.9 107.4 107.9 105.0 107.0 109.3 110.1 109.9 110.4 113.4 113.0 110.6 114.9
Uruguay 100.2 99.7 103.4 106.9 110.6 86.5 89.7 97.8 109.6 114.0 115.1 114.6 116.1
Venezuela 92.7 91.7 93.2 95.9 94.4 84.3 89.0 98.8 101.3 100.6 94.2 95.2 93.3
Middle East & North Africa
Bahrain 98.6 89.9 86.6 94.1 93.5 105.5 103.5 96.0 97.5 99.7 98.3 102.8 107.1
Egypt 106.9 104.3 102.5 102.0 102.7 102.1 100.0 98.2 98.8 99.2 101.6 101.9 105.5
Israel 104.2 102.2 103.9 106.9 106.3 103.9 104.8 105.3 107.0 107.7 108.5 111.3 113.5
Jordan 106.1 103.8 102.7 104.0 101.9 104.6 106.6 103.1 102.6 106.5 105.9 106.1 109.2
Lebanon 99.0 98.5 100.2 97.3 93.4 100.8 103.5 98.1 98.9 99.0 97.4 104.0 108.3
Morocco 100.1 99.4 98.4 97.1 101.6 101.5 104.3 104.2 104.1 105.7 107.6 105.7 105.8
Saudi Arabia 94.9 89.4 92.4 96.1 99.0 100.3 100.3 102.6 119.1 123.0 120.3 122.1 123.0
Tunisia 90.6 92.3 93.4 93.6 93.2 93.2 91.6 93.3 95.7 99.7 99.6 100.9 104.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana 126.7 129.1 126.7 129.5 127.0 126.2 122.7 120.8 122.8 124.6 126.0 121.5 121.0
Côte d'Ivoire 83.1 87.3 88.0 80.8 86.0 92.3 84.1 84.0 86.0 84.4 87.6 87.7 95.7
Ethiopia 96.8 95.0 91.9 89.2 87.3 91.2 81.6 91.8 89.0 92.1 102.4 90.6 96.8
Ghana 87.1 90.9 86.8 77.4 79.0 87.8 95.3 101.1 103.1 110.5 108.5 99.8 99.8
Kenya 96.0 92.0 88.2 89.1 94.2 93.3 92.1 92.5 97.6 100.3 100.6 95.5 98.3
Nigeria 90.7 90.5 86.5 88.5 87.3 90.4 86.4 93.1 95.9 106.1 105.3 101.7 101.3
Senegal 92.3 93.2 91.0 92.2 92.5 92.3 98.4 102.3 103.3 103.1 96.5 94.9 98.2
South Africa 103.8 105.9 109.7 108.0 106.4 106.3 109.8 109.7 107.8 105.5 104.9 106.8 108.3
Tanzania 98.5 101.1 101.6 98.5 98.7 104.7 105.0 102.5 100.3 100.3 104.6 101.1 101.0
Uganda 95.9 97.5 97.2 97.1 101.1 104.1 99.9 105.5 108.2 105.2 109.2 105.4 107.1
Zambia 84.0 70.3 72.1 74.1 66.7 77.4 79.4 84.5 93.4 100.2 96.8 92.3 91.7
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A1About the Asian Development Bank
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its 
developing member countries substantially reduce poverty and improve the quality of life 
of their people. Despite the region’s many successes, it remains home to two-thirds of the 
world’s poor: 1.8 billion people who live on less than $2 a day, with 903 million struggling 
on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty through inclusive 
economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main 
instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity 
investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.
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